Transport company. Rubber stamp. Discussion circle. Yes, these are some of the less than flattering descriptions often ascribed to the Riksdag, or Swedish Parliament. Are they true? Well, perhaps they stretch the reality of our elected officials a bit. But what is true is that very few parliamentary votes during the past term of office have come out of left field.

Several processes warrant consideration in this context. Some macro trends continue regardless of who is in power at the moment. One such trend is the ongoing internationalisation of politics – more and more subject areas and decisions are being shifted from the national to the supranational level. It is often said that at least 50 per cent of Swedish legislation is dependent on the EU. We can therefore state that the level of influence over political substance wielded by our elected officials has declined.

To this should be added the increasing complexity that characterises many policy areas. Gone are the days when a politician could confidently master several different areas in detail. Instead, officials, agencies, organisations and companies have won greater influence – for the simple reason that they are the only ones who understand the details.

This text, however, chiefly addresses the relationship between the government and the Riksdag. The combination of majority government – as we had during the last term of office – and tough party discipline means that, for all practical purposes, an issue is settled as soon as the government sends a bill to the Riksdag. The Riksdag’s handling of a matter is thus largely a formality. Only a few issues have roused real excitement over the past four years – the energy agreement and gay marriage belong to this select group.

In most cases, the left/right axis in Swedish politics is carved in stone. But on a number of issues – often liberal vs. conservative lifestyle issues – this pattern is broken and a consensus can suddenly arise between, for example, a member of the Left Party and a member of the Centre Party. This is how several of the smaller parliamentary parties united in opposition to the FRA law, while the two dominating political parties, (S) and (M), were in effect positive towards the legislative regulation of signals intelligence.

Two camps have quickly emerged in the debate following the election: one is trying to point out that a minority government is the norm in Sweden, while the other is arguing that the Reinfeldt government will have a hard time governing from a minority position. Both arguments are both correct and incorrect.

Our proportional electoral system rarely produces a majority government, and this complicates the formation of government. A number of special rules have been built in to the system to compensate for this, tailored to allow a minority government to push their bills through.

Excluding the past term of office, Sweden’s last majority government was during Fälldin’s second term which ended in May 1981. The normal state of affairs in Sweden has been a Social Democratic minority government acting with a regular partner. In Ingvar Carlsson’s time this partner was primarily the Centre Party; in Göran Persson’s time it was mainly the Green Party. For all practical purposes, this means that the government’s majority was rarely threatened. The alternative to regular partners is ”jumping majorities”, used by the Bildt government from 1991-94. This creates a far less predictable situation, albeit with greater freedom.

This suggests that the sitting government will be able to carry most of its bills, particularly the most important ones. What complicates matters is the fact that it is harder for a coalition government to find a majority for its bills, since it must first find an internal government compromise position to serve as the basis for a negotiation that must be continuously re-established among coalition partners. The scope for bilateral agreements also diminishes with a united red-green opposition, while the ”third bloc” – Sweden Democrats (SD) – is not included in negotiations for reasons of principle.

This is why the Alliance government’s current position is more difficult than Göran Persson’s position during his period as prime minister of a minority government from 1996-20006.
What does this mean for the parliamentary work during this term of office?

An initial conclusion may be that parliamentary power will increase with a minority government. This will be felt primarily in committee work, where the government must look for support for its bills – chiefly from the Social Democrats or Green Party and more rarely from the Left Party. The centre-right parties’ parliamentary leaders will have a more central role during this term of office, since it will be absolute critical that Alliance party members hold the government’s line.

Having learned from the previous centre-right government’s inability to stick together during the entire term of office, the Reinfeldt government has not distinguished itself for its desire to take any major risks in the legislation process. But certain losses will be inevitable – beginning, perhaps, with the presence of Swedish troops in Afghanistan. [The argument against this is the probability that (S) will eventually follow its own conference decision and vote for the government’s bill to extend troop presence.]

A second conclusion is thus that the government will try to create extra-parliamentary support for its policies. And before anyone asks: No, this doesn’t mean that the government ministers will arrange demonstrations and parades to win support for their policies. Rather, the government will be more active outside the parliamentary arena in order to gain support from the opposition parties.

It is most likely that the four Alliance party leaders will maintain ongoing dialogue with the Green and/or Social Democrat party leaders during the bill preparation process in order to avoid heavy losses in parliament.

If this becomes the prevalent method of conducting government business, parliamentary power will be reduced once again and the Sweden Democrats’ votes will not be decisive. On the other hand, the opposition will want to demonstrate that it is in fact the opposition. Too many deals done behind closed doors could also add to the SD’s media martyrdom. Both the government and the opposition are, of course, aware of this.

The most likely scenario is therefore a combination of party leader agreements and committee negotiations, the outcome of which will be a mixed bag of wins and losses for government bills.

The lesson learned from other countries where populist and extreme parties have managed to enter parliament is that these parties gain the most power when other parties take one of two extreme paths: either ignoring the party in question and pretending it doesn’t exist, or including them in a coalition and actively negotiating with them to win policy support. The first strategy risks exacerbating the public’s discontent with the established parties, while the second strategy affords the extreme party direct influence over policy formulation.

To date, both Reinfeldt and Sahlin have tended towards the first strategy. But both are suffering from post-traumatic election syndrome – Sahlin is overcompensating for her loss with vigorous fighting spirit and Reinfeldt continues to act as if he’s leading a majority government.

Soon enough, dreary, workaday life will resume and with it politics at its best – the arduous, time-consuming process of distilling conflicting positions into satisfying compromise solutions.

Björn Johansson, JKL